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Introduction
Cryptocurrencies have become an international business.  In early
2013, the value of the global cryptocurrency market was less than $2 bil-
lion.1  As of May 2018, it has transformed into a $400 billion digital pay-
ment ecosystem.2  Nearly $15 billion in cryptocurrency transactions are
executed daily around the world,3 and that number is rising daily.  This
increase has largely been driven by the recent rise in initial coin offerings
(“ICOs”),4 a fundraiser in which a promoter sells a unique digital “coin” or
“token” called a “cryptocurrency” to investors in exchange for money or
established cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin or Ether.5  ICOs have become
popular among startups as a means to quickly raise capital by circum-
venting the highly-regulated capital-raising process venture capitalists and
1. Cryptocurrency Market Capitalizations; Historical Snapshot - April 28, 2013,
COINMARKETCAP https://coinmarketcap.com/historical/20130428/ (reporting that on
April 28, 2013, the total market capitalization for cryptocurrencies was approximately
$1.6 billion U.S. dollars) [https://perma.cc/FE6A-YFT8].
2. Cryptocurrency Market Capitalizations, COINMARKETCAP, https://coinmarket-
cap.com [https://perma.cc/A4HR-MDSR].
3. Id.
4. See CoinDesk ICO Tracker, COINDESK https://www.coindesk.com/ico-tracker/
(last updated Jan. 1, 2018) (disclosing that there were 343 ICOs in 2017, up from 256
ICOs in 2016) [ ]; see also Investor Bulletin: Initial Coin Offerings, SEC (July 25, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-and-bulletins/ib_coinofferings (warning inves-
tors about the recent increase in ICOs and their potential for fraud) [https://perma.cc/
PM86-SJRB]; Daniel N. Budofsky et al., Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs): The Current State of
Play, PILLSBURY (Nov. 3, 2017), https://www.pillsburylaw.com/en/news-and-insights/
icos-current-state.html (explaining how the global market capitalization of cryptocur-
rencies surged in 2017 as a result of the rapid rise in the number of ICOs and the value
of popular cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and Ether) [https://perma.cc/T9YA-ASJ4].
5. See Investor Bulletin: Initial Coin Offerings, supra note 4.
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underwriters follow in initial public offerings.6
The growth of this generally unregulated fundraising process, how-
ever, has simultaneously led to serious concerns regarding its legality,
accountability, and control.7  In July 2017, the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) announced for the first time that it
would begin regulating the offer and sale of cryptocurrencies in connec-
tion with ICOs.8  The SEC cautioned that these “virtual coins or tokens
may be securities,”9 and it is on “high alert” for ICOs that violate the
United States securities laws.10
Since the SEC’s initial warning and May 2018, the SEC initiated six
lawsuits and administrative enforcement proceedings in connection with
ICOs and similar cryptocurrency offerings11 for violations of the registra-
tion requirements of sections 5(a) and 5(c) of the Securities Act of 1933
(the “Securities Act”)12 and the antifraud provisions of section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”)13 and Rule 10b-5
thereunder.14  These lawsuits include a Canadian ICO that raised $15 mil-
lion from investors worldwide15 and a Texas ICO that raised over $600
million from investors around the globe to fund what it claimed to be the
world’s first “decentralized bank.”16  Notably, the judges in these cases
have not yet decided whether the ICOs are “securities” and, therefore, sub-
ject to the federal securities laws.17
6. See Budofsky et al., supra note 4; see also ICOs (Initial Coin Offerings): The New
Rage of Crypto-market, CRYPTOTALKS (Dec. 13, 2017), www.cryptotalks.in/en/icos-initial-
coin-offerings-the-new-rage-of-crypto-market (asserting that startups are increasingly
utilizing ICOs instead of traditional fund-raising strategies such as venture capitalism
and IPOs because ICOs have more favorable tax, regulatory, and liquidity consequences
and have been generally unregulated) [https://perma.cc/4WYH-CEV2].
7. Divya Joshi, These are the Trends Affecting the Cryptocurrency Market in 2017,
BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 19, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/cryptocurrency-market-
coin-trends-cap-value-2017-9 [https://perma.cc/UF9K-VLLM].
8. SEC Issues Investigative Report Concluding DAO Tokens, a Digital Asset, Were
Securities, SEC (July 25, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-131
[https://perma.cc/VZ5Y-FSP5].
9. Id. (emphasis added).
10. Opening Remarks at the Securities Regulation Institute, SEC (Jan. 22, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-clayton-012218 [https://perma.cc/YN2E-
FJ29].
11. See Jason P. Gottlieb, MoCo Cryptocurrency Litigation Tracker, MORRISON COHEN
1– 2, 6– 8 https://www.morrisoncohen.com/siteFiles/files/MoCo%20Cryptocurrency
%20Litigation%20Tracker%201-30-18.pdf (updated as of May 14, 2018) [https://
perma.cc/3T5U-D48C]
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a), 77e(c) (2012).
13. Id. § 78j(b) (2010).
14. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2017).
15. SEC v. PlexCorps, No. 1:17-cv-07007-CBA-RML, 2017 WL 5988934 (E.D.N.Y.
Dec. 1, 2017).
16. SEC v. REcoin Grp. Found., LLC, No. 1:17-cv-05725, 2017 WL 4329876
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2017).
17. See Mem. and Order at 3, REcoin Grp., No. 1:17-cv-05725 (Jan. 31, 2018), ECF
No. 24 (withholding decision as to whether the underlying ICO is a “security” in the
SEC enforcement lawsuit pending the resolution of the related criminal action but per-
mitting the SEC to submit briefs to help the criminal court consider the question); Min.
Order and Min. Entry, PlexCorps, No. 1:17-cv-07007-CBA-RML (Jan. 9, 2018) (setting
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\51-1\CIN108.txt unknown Seq: 4  9-AUG-18 16:39
248 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 51
Although the SEC is moving swiftly to prosecute fraudulent and unre-
gistered ICOs, many securities lawyers argue that it does not have the con-
gressional authority to do so because ICOs are not “securities.”18  As of
May 14, 2018, five federal SEC enforcement lawsuits involving ICOs and
similar cryptocurrency offerings are challenging this precise issue.19  One
federal district court judge in Brooklyn, New York is expected to be the
first to rule on this important question by the summer of 2018.20  Ulti-
mately, this judge’s ruling will turn on the critical distinction of whether
ICOs are “investment contracts” under the Supreme Court’s investment
contracts test promulgated in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.21  If ICOs are not
investment contracts, then the SEC may lack the jurisdiction to regulate
ICOs because they are not securities.22
Accordingly, because no federal court as of the date of this Note has
ruled on whether ICOs are securities and, if they are, how the U.S. securi-
ties laws should apply to cross-border ICOs, two key issues arise: (1)
whether the SEC has the congressional authority to regulate ICOs and, if it
does, (2) whether that regulatory authority also extends to “foreign” ICOs
that involve either non-domestic issuers and domestic investors or domes-
oral arguments for decision of whether the ICO was a “security” for June 19, 2018); see
also Patricia Hurtado, A Major Court Case Will Decide Whether Bitcoin Can Be Regulated
Like Stocks and Bonds, TIME (Jan. 29, 2018), time.com/money/5123510/are-cryptocur
rencies-and-icos-scams-the-government-will-soon-decide/ (explaining that no federal
court has yet decided whether ICOs are “securities”) [https://perma.cc/PQ8A-P2Z9].
18. See Hurtado, supra note 17.
19. See SEC v. Sharma, No. 1:18-cv-02909, 2018 WL 1603904 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 2,
2018) (SEC court action against two Florida co-founders of a Florida-based financial
services start-up for defrauding investors throughout the world in an ICO that raised
$32 million); SEC v. Montroll, No. 1:18-cv-01582, 2018 WL 1001076 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21,
2018) (SEC court action against an unregistered Texas-based Bitcoin-denominated
securities exchange and its Texas operator for defrauding exchange users by misappro-
priating their bitcoins and for failing to disclose a cyberattack that resulted in the theft
of more than 6,000 bitcoins and selling unregistered securities that purported to be
investments in the exchange); SEC v. AriseBank, No. 3:18-cv-00186-M, 2018 WL 623772
(N.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2018) (SEC court action against a Texas-based cryptocurrency bank
and its Texas operators for defrauding investors throughout the world and selling unre-
gistered securities in an ICO that raised $600 million on the claim that it was the world’s
first “decentralized” bank); PlexCorps, 2017 WL 5988934 (SEC court action against a
“recidivist securities law violator” in Canada and his Canadian partner for misappropri-
ating $15 million in investor funds raised from investors around the world through a
fraudulent and unregistered ICO); REcoin Grp., 2017 WL 4329876 (SEC court action
against a New York businessman and two U.S.-based companies for defrauding investors
throughout the world of $300,000 in a pair of ICOs purportedly backed by investments
in real estate and diamonds).
20. See Min. Order and Min. Entry, PlexCorps, No. 1:17-cv-07007-CBA-RML (Jan. 9,
2018).
21. 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946) (“The test is whether the scheme involves an invest-
ment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of
others.”).
22. See id.  But cf. Order Granting in Part and Den. in Part Defs.’ Mot. for R., SEC v.
Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2014 WL 12622292, at *8, n. 6 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2014)
(declining to address the SEC’s argument that the Bitcoin-denominated investments were
also “notes” under the U.S. securities laws after having determined that they were
“investment contracts” under Howey, leaving the question open for other courts).
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tic issuers and non-domestic investors.  This Note seeks to fill that judicial
void.
To facilitate the understanding of ICOs, Section I briefly describes the
function of the blockchain, the distributed ledger technology underpinning
Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies.  It also describes the application of
cryptocurrencies in ICOs.
Section II demonstrates that most ICOs meet the definition of a secur-
ity under Howey23 and, therefore, can be regulated by the SEC like stock or
bond offerings.
Section III analyzes the legality of the SEC’s current approach to the
regulation of cross-border ICO transactions in light of the longstanding
principle that the U.S. securities laws do not have extraterritorial applica-
tion.24  The section begins by addressing the main securities registration25
and antifraud26 statutes through which the SEC regulates cross-border
ICOs.  It further explains how a Utah federal district court judge in 2017
held that section 929P of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”)27 restores the “conduct and
effects test” with respect to SEC court enforcement actions.28  This test
authorizes the SEC to bring fraud claims concerning securities bought or
sold entirely outside the U.S. or involving entirely foreign investors so long
as wrongful conduct related to the ICO, such as pre-sale activity, occurred
in or had a foreseeable substantial effect in the U.S.29  Lastly, the Note
concludes that the extensive extraterritorial reach of the conduct and
effects test contravenes the very essence of Regulation S’s safe harbor for
extraterritorial offerings and the U.S.’s longstanding territorial approach to
securities regulation.
I. Background
A. What Is a Cryptocurrency?
A cryptocurrency is a decentralized, peer-to-peer digital currency that
is used similarly to money.30  It “functions as a medium of exchange, unit
23. 328 U.S. at 301.
24. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 248 (2010).
25. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a), 77e(c) (2012).
26. Id. § 78j(b) (2010) (prohibits certain deceptive practices “in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security”); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2017) (adopting similar lan-
guage); Id. § 77q(a) (forbids deceptive practices “in the offer or sale of any securities”
regardless of scienter).
27. Pub. L. No. 111– 203, § 929P(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1864– 65 (2010).
28. See SEC v. Traffic Monsoon, LLC, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1275, 1294 (D. Utah 2017).
29. See id. (finding that the issuer made “significant steps” in the U.S. in furtherance
of the sale of fraudulent securities for purposes of 10b-5 liability because he created and
promoted the securities while physically residing in the U.S., although 90% of the sales
were made to foreign investors).
30. Investor Alert: Bitcoin and Other Virtual Currency-Related Investments, SEC (May
7, 2014), https://investor.gov/additional-resources/news-alerts/alerts-bulletins/investor-
alert-bitcoin-other-virtual-currency [hereinafter Investor Alert: Bitcoin]; Noelle Acheson,
What Is Bitcoin?, COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/information/what-is-bitcoin/
(last updated Jan. 26, 2018) [https://perma.cc/2HSW-HD8V].
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\51-1\CIN108.txt unknown Seq: 6  9-AUG-18 16:39
250 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 51
of account, or store of value.”31  Because it has an equivalent market value
in real currency, it can be exchanged for traditional currencies, such as the
U.S. dollar or the euro.32  Bitcoin is an example of this type of “convertible”
digital currency.33  Convertible digital cryptocurrencies can be used to
purchase goods or services online.34  They are also used to trade invest-
ments and transfer money.35  Although a cryptocurrency operates simi-
larly to a real currency, it has several important features that distinguish it
from conventional government-backed currencies.36
The most important characteristic distinguishing a cryptocurrency
from conventional currency is that it is decentralized.37  This means that
no single person or central authority governs it.38  It is also not backed by
any government because it is not a legal tender.39  Unlike U.S. dollars or
euros which are printed by a treasury and central banks, cryptocurrencies
are digitally created by networks of people that anyone can join.40  These
networks also process transactions made with the cryptocurrencies, effec-
tively making their own self-operated payment networks.41
Governments have struggled to regulate these cryptocurrency net-
works because they are global and extremely intricate.42  For example, the
Bitcoin has an expansive peer-to-peer network comprised of millions of
computers all over the world that are connected via the internet.43
Through a process called “mining,” these computers solve complex mathe-
matical formulas to electronically create Bitcoins and process Bitcoin trans-
31. I.R.S. Notice 2014-21 at 1, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-14-21.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S4WS-SUGV].
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Acheson, supra note 30; Rainer Bohme et al., Bitcoin: Economics, Technology,
and Governance, 29 J. ECON. PERS. 213, 219 (2015).
37. Bohme et al., supra note 36, at 219.
38. Id.
39. I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, supra note 31, at 1.
40. Acheson, supra note 30.
41. Id.
42. See e.g., Investor Alert: Bitcoin, supra note 30 (noting that U.S. law enforcement
and SEC officials face inherent difficulty in investigating the illicit use of cryptocur-
rencies, like Bitcoin, because the transactions are encrypted; it is difficult to trace the
flow of money because traditional banks are not involved; there is no central authority
that collects user information; transactions and users span the globe; and the SEC is
often unable to obtain information located overseas); see also Bohme et al., supra note
36, at 231 (“A key challenge for prospective regulators is where to impose constraints. It
is infeasible to regulate all peers in the Bitcoin network due to their quantity, their geo-
graphic distribution, and the privacy protections in the network.”).
43. See Neighbourhood Pool Watch: Bitcoin Mining Pool, Network, and Exchange Analy-
sis –  August 23, 2015 Network Statistics, ORGAN OFCORTI (Aug. 23, 2015), http://organof
corti.blogspot.com.au/2015/08/august-23rd-2015-network-statistics.html?q=%22num
ber+of+miners%22&view=snapshot (estimating that there are over 100,000 Bitcoin min-
ers in mining pools with tens to hundreds of computers each) [https://perma.cc/43CY-
AV8F].
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actions.44  Every Bitcoin transaction is validated and transmitted by
“nodes” to the public distributed ledger called the “blockchain.”45  Just
about anyone in the world with the specialized computer hardware can
download the Bitcoin software and take part in the Bitcoin mining or node
validation process.46  This means that, in theory, one central authority can-
not use monetary policy to shut down an entire Bitcoin network or to take
Bitcoins away from its people,47 as China attempted to do when it banned
ICOs in September 2017.48  Moreover, if some part of the Bitcoin network
goes offline because of government regulation or for any other reason, the
cryptocurrency keeps on transmitting because the Bitcoin has a global
decentralized network of computers, consisting of an estimated 10,307
nodes as of May 15, 2018.49  Thus, it has no single point of failure.50
B. What is an Initial Coin Offering (“ICO”)?
1. Startups Use ICOs to Fundraise
An ICO is an alternative fundraising model similar to an equity
crowdfunding.  It is a process through which startups raise money to fund
a business project by using distributed ledger technology to sell digital
coins and tokens to investors.51  Investors in an ICO generally invest using
money or cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin.52  They typically buy the
cryptocurrency in the hope that the fundraised project will become suc-
cessful after it launches and the value of the cryptocurrency will rise above
44. See Noelle Acheson, How Bitcoin Mining Works, COINDESK, https://www.coin
desk.com/information/how-bitcoin-mining-works/ (last updated Jan. 29, 2018) [https:/
/perma.cc/66LG-FZNL].
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See Acheson, supra note 30; Bohme et al., supra note 36, at 219.
48. See Lulu Yilun Chen & Justina Lee, Bitcoin Tumbles as PBOC Declares Initial Coin
Offerings Illegal, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 4, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles
/2017-09-04/china-central-bank-says-initial-coin-offerings-are-illegal (“China’s central
bank said initial coin offerings are illegal and asked all related fundraising activity to be
halted immediately. . . . The regulator said that those who have already raised money
must provide refunds, though it didn’t specify how the money would be paid back to
investors.”) [https://perma.cc/KQ8E-K54F]; Kenneth Rapoza, China’s ‘Bitcoin Ban’ No
Match For Stateless Cryptocurrency Market, FORBES (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.forbes.
com/sites/kenrapoza/2017/10/18/chinas-blockchain-bitcoin-ban-no-match-for-stateless
-cryptocurrency-market/#1430852de6bf (explaining how Chinese investors have found
ways around China’s September 2017 ICO ban by shifting to more peer-to-peer investing
done in private, investing using crypto wallet accounts formed in other countries, and
using foreign ICO platforms to target Chinese investors) [https://perma.cc/27CC-
5VFX].
49. Global Bitcoin Nodes Distribution, BITNODES, https://bitnodes.earn.com/ [https://
bitnodes.earn.com/].
50. See Bohme et al., supra note 36, at 219 (stating that Bitcoin’s decentralized sys-
tem prevents the concentration of power so that no individual or entity could take con-
trol over the network, and it has no central point of failure).
51. L.S., What Are Initial Coin Offerings?, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 22, 2017), https://
www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2017/08/economist-explains-17 [https:
//perma.cc/55SC-HJWV].
52. Id.
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what they purchased it for.53  Similar to a stock, the cryptocurrency serves
a dual purpose: it may represent ownership rights in the company or a unit
of value that can be traded for profit on a secondary market.54
2. ICOs are Inherently Risky
ICOs raise concerns of money laundering, fraud, and theft.55  The
cryptocurrency issued in an ICO is decentralized and encrypted, meaning
it is difficult to track its sale and the identity of the individuals behind it.56
Moreover, the high-risks of investing in ICOs are not yet well understood by
investors, who can be easily lured with the promise of high returns in a
new investment space.57  This risk is exacerbated by the fact that startups
with little or no operating history use ICOs to raise capital quickly without
having to disclose substantive information to investors.58  Ultimately, these
risks are difficult to ameliorate.  In theory, any person in the world with an
internet connection and a digital wallet can participate in an ICO, making
an ICO difficult to regulate by any single country.  This creates opportuni-
ties for criminals to launder money, finance terrorism activities, and carry
out other fraudulent schemes across borders, particularly in countries
where corruption is rampant.59
3. The U.S. Regulators Are Increasing Regulatory Efforts to Target Cross-
Border ICOs
In the U.S., the SEC is leading the regulation against cryptocurrencies,
albeit slowly.  In July 2017, four years after the first ICO, the SEC cau-
tioned that “some” ICOs “may” be considered securities subject to the fed-
eral securities laws.60  But the SEC has not provided clear guidance on the
legality of different types of ICO structures or how it will regulate them.
Indeed, to date the SEC has not issued any formal rules governing ICOs.61
Nor has a single ICO issuer registered its cryptocurrency offering under a
S-1 filing with the SEC.62  Instead, most of the recent ICOs have bypassed
SEC vetting altogether by filing Form Ds, which permit issuers to exempt
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Investor Alert: Bitcoin, supra note 30.
56. Bohme et al., supra note 36, at 219.
57. See Investor Alert: Bitcoin, supra note 30.
58. Id.
59. See Bohme et al., supra note 36, at 230.
60. SEC Issues Investigative Report Concluding DAO Tokens, a Digital Asset, Were
Securities, supra note 8.
61. Rather, the SEC has imposed a “I will know it when I see it” standard as its
framework for classifying ICOs as regulatable securities. See id. (“Whether a particular
investment transaction involves the offer or sale of a security –  regardless of the termi-
nology or technology used –  will depend on the facts and circumstances, including the
economic realities of the transaction.”); Brady Dale, Ex-SEC Lawyer Predicts ‘Assembly
Line’ for ICO Enforcement, COINDESK (Nov. 26, 2017), https://www.coindesk.com/sec-
icos-nicolas-morgan-paul-hastings/ (last updated Nov. 27, 2017) [https://perma.cc/
H274-BKSA].
62. McKenna & Marriner, Here’s the Blueprint for How ICOs Are Getting off the
Ground Without SEC Vetting, MARKETWATCH (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.
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their cryptocurrency offerings from registration.63  Some hypothesize that
the reason the SEC has been slow to regulate ICOs is because of jurisdic-
tional limitations; many ICOs are cross-border transactions and attract
buyers from around the world.  Others argue, as the SEC Chairman has
conceded, that it is often unclear whether the coins or tokens are securities.
Despite these setbacks, the SEC has made significant strides in halting
fraudulent ICOs.  Between the SEC’s initial July 2017 warning and May
2018, the SEC has initiated five lawsuits and one administrative enforce-
ment proceeding in connection with ICOs for the violation of the antifraud
and registration provisions of the Securities Act and Exchange Act.64  Nota-
bly, one of these lawsuits involves a foreign ICO issuer, and nearly all of
these lawsuits concern ICOs that made sales to foreign investors.65
Although none of the federal judges presiding in these cases has yet ruled
whether the ICOs are securities, three federal judges have already issued
preliminary injunctions halting three allegedly fraudulent ICOs, including
one Canadian offering.66  In each case, the judges determined that the SEC
had made a substantial showing of likelihood of success that the ICOs were
securities.67  Although final rulings are still pending as of the date of this
Note, these cases predict how those courts will ultimately rule on the secur-
ity issue.
The U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) is also
playing an increasingly important role in the global regulation of
cryptocurrencies that are traded after an ICO.  The CFTC first announced
that cryptocurrencies are commodities under the Commodity Exchange
Act in 2015.68  It filed its first lawsuit in connection with a Bitcoin-trading
Ponzi scheme in September 2017.69  In January 2018, the CFTC began to
aggressively crack down on the trading of cryptocurrencies following its
joint statement with the SEC saying that both agencies would “bring
actions to stop and prevent fraud in the offer and sale of digital instru-
ments.”  Within a few days of the release of statement, the CFTC brought
three lawsuits against allegedly fraudulent cryptocurrency investment
schemes, including one lawsuit against a United Kingdom-registered com-
pany who operated an alleged Ponzi scheme in which he solicited at $1.1
million from more than 600 investors worldwide.70  These actions are a
further sign that the U.S. derivatives and securities regulators are collabo-
rating to police cross-border cryptocurrency schemes.
com/story/number-of-icos-getting-regulation-lite-treatment-is-growing-2018-02-21
[https://perma.cc/DX5M-PFJ7].
63. Id. (revealing that 83 ICOs that were transacted between 2017 and 2018 filed
SEC Form Ds to exempt their offerings from SEC registration).
64. See Gottlieb, supra note 11, at 1– 2, 6– 8.
65. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See In re  Coinflip, Inc., CFTC Docket No. 15– 29, available at http://www.
cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleading/enfcoin
fliprorder09172015.pdf [https://perma.cc/6E43-W25T].
69. See CFTC v. Gelfman, No. 1:17-cv-07181-PKC (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2017).
70. See CFTC v. Dean, No 2:18-cv-00345 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2018).
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The U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) is also
stepping in to combat money laundering and terrorism financing in con-
nection with ICOs.  On March 6, 2018, it released a letter stating that devel-
opers that sell “convertible virtual currency” in the form of “ICO coins or
tokens” are money service business and must comply with bank secrecy
and know-your-customer regulations.71  The statement follows FinCEN’s
July 26, 2017 action in which it assessed civil monetary penalties against a
foreign located cryptocurrency exchange for violating U.S. anti-money-
laundering laws and complicity in Bitcoin-related criminal enterprises.72
This highlights the previously unspoken principle that a foreign entity
operating as a money services business with activities in the U.S. will be
subject to regulation.
ANALYSIS
II. The SEC Has Congressional Authority to Regulate Most ICOs
In enacting the federal securities laws, Congress sought to protect U.S.
investors in “securities,” as that term is defined under the Securities Act
and the Exchange Act.73  Over the last seventy years, the U.S. regulators
and courts have developed a variety of standards to determine whether
investments in anything ranging from citrus groves to online virtual games
constitute securities and are therefore subject to the federal securities laws.
The federal courts, however, are grappling to understand the novel concept
of a “cryptocurrency” and how to classify cryptocurrencies that are distrib-
uted in ICOs.74  This section seeks to provide come clarity by demonstrat-
ing how the economic reality of most purchases of cryptocurrencies in
ICOs are more akin to securities rather than non-security purchases of
commodities or rights.  Ultimately, rather than guess anew in each case,
the courts should apply this presumption in all cases, preserving a stable
71. Dep’t of the Treasury, Comment Letter on the Financial Crime Enforcement Net-
work Under the Bank Secrecy Act in Connection with Virtual Currencies (Feb. 13,
2018), https://coincenter.org/files/2018-03/fincen-ico-letter-march-2018-coin-cen
ter.pdf.
72. In Re BTC-E, No. 2017– 03, https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/enforce
ment_action/2017-07-26/Assessment%20for%20BTCeVinnik%20FINAL%20SignDate
%2007.26.17.pdf [https://perma.cc/VG7S-E7GL].
73. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a– 77aa (2012) (focusing on the offer and sale of “securi-
ties”); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a– 78qq (2016) (same).
74. The federal courts are evaluating whether ICOs are securities that can be regu-
lated by the SEC. See Hurtado, supra note 17.  To date, there is no court precedent that
answers this question because the limited number of SEC enforcement proceedings that
have considered whether an ICO or a similar cryptocurrency investment scheme is a
security have been uncontested. See Prelim. Inj. as to Defs. Jared Rice Sr. and AriseBank,
SEC v. AriseBank, No. 3:18-cv-00186-M (N.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 2018), ECF No. 61 (unop-
posed preliminary injunction); In re Munchee Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10445 at 1
(Dec. 11, 2017) (unopposed cease-and-desist order); In re Erik Vorhees, Securities Act
Release No. 9592 at 1 (June 3, 2014) (same). But cf. Report of Investigation Pursuant to
Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO, Exchange Act Release
No. 81207 at 1 (July 25, 2017) (dropping charges but concluding that the token offering
was a security).
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background against which the SEC and courts can regulate with predict-
able effects.
A. What is a Security?
The definition of a security under section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act
and section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act includes broad categories of
financial instruments, such as profit-sharing agreements and investment
contracts.75  Congress intended this broad definition to apply not only to
the financial arrangements known to Congress at the time the statutes were
enacted, but also to any prospective, novel instruments created by those
who seek to use the money of others on the promise of profits.76
B. Most ICOs are Securities Because They Are Investment Contracts
Under the Howey Test
ICOs are not, by default, securities because they are not included
within the statutory definition of a security, but they fall squarely within
the category of an investment contract.  Supreme Court decisions dating
back to SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. have defined an investment contract as a
contract, transaction, or scheme whereby an individual (1) invests money,
(2) in a common enterprise, and (3) is led to expect profits (4) solely from
the efforts of the promoter or a third party.77  In concluding that the trans-
actions were investment contracts, the Supreme Court in Howey deter-
mined that the individuals who invested in a small tract of land used as a
citrus grove were offered more than just the sale of land.78  They were
induced by the opportunity to contribute money and to share in the profits
of a large citrus fruit enterprise.79  The Supreme Court explained:
[A]ll the elements of a profit-seeking business venture are present here.  The
investors provide the capital and share in the earnings and profits; the pro-
moters manage, control and operate the enterprise.  It follows that the
arrangements whereby the investors’ interests are made manifest involve
investment contracts, regardless of the legal terminology in which such con-
tracts are clothed.80
Thus, the Supreme Court in Howey deliberately did not present a single,
determinative factor in defining an investment contract but rather looked
to the investment package as a whole, including the ways in which the
investment was marketed to investors.  Accordingly, the test for whether an
ICO is a security requires a factual inquiry into the economic reality of the
transaction.81  Each of the four Howey elements must be viewed in that vein
75. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(3)(a)(1) (2016).
76. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
77. Id. at 298– 99; Long v. Shultz Cattle Co., 881 F.2d 129, 132 (1989) (applying the
Howey test).
78. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299.
79. Id. at 300.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 298.
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and satisfied before a court will conclude that an ICO is a security.82  That
inquiry is conducted below.
1. SEC v. Shavers: Cryptocurrencies are an “Investment of Money”
The notion that cryptocurrencies constitute an “investment of money”
was first settled in SEC v. Shavers.83  In that case, which represents the first
SEC lawsuit in connection with a fraudulent cryptocurrency investment
scheme, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas entered a
judgment against Trendon T. Shavers, a Texas man, and his Texas-based
company, Bitcoin Savings and Trust (“BTCST”) for defrauding investors in
a $4.5 million Ponzi scheme involving Bitcoin.84  Shavers offered and sold
Bitcoin-denominated investments through the internet and promised inves-
tors up to seven-percent weekly interest based on BTCST’s proclaimed
Bitcoin market arbitrage activity.85
Shavers challenged the SEC’s jurisdiction on the contention that the
BTCST investments were not investment contracts under Howey because
investors paid for the interest in Bitcoins.86  He argued that Bitcoins are not
currency that can be regulated and, therefore, the interests did not involve
an “investment of money.”87  The court disagreed and drew a distinction
between the issue of whether Bitcoin itself is “money” and whether the
BTCST investments, taken as a whole, including the ways in which they
were marketed to investors, are “investment contracts.”88
In its August 26, 2014 ruling, the court held that the BTCST invest-
ments were investment contracts under Howey.  The court determined that
Bitcoin (1) was an investment of money because it could be “used as”
money or currency; (2) there was a common enterprise in that investors
were dependent on Shavers’s expertise in Bitcoin markets and his local
connections; and that the investors (3) expected profits in the form of
weekly interest (4) solely from the efforts of Shavers’s Bitcoin arbitrage
activity.89  Accordingly, the court concluded that Shavers and BTCST vio-
lated the registration and antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws
and ordered them to pay more than $40 million in disgorged profits and
civil penalties of $150,000 each.90  Shavers was also sentenced to eighteen
months in prison.91
82. See Shultz Cattle, 881 F.2d at 132 (interpreting the Howey test).
83. No. 4:13-CV-416, 2014 WL 12622292, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2014) (order
granting in part and denying in part defendants’ motion for reconsideration and holding
that the Bitcoin-denominated investment scheme was a security).
84. Id. at *2.
85. Id. at *6.
86. Id. at *1.
87. Id. at *5– 6.
88. Id. at *4.
89. Id. at *1, *6.
90. Id., 2014 WL 4652121, at *13 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2014) (order granting sum-
mary judgment in favor of the SEC).
91. Trendon Shavers Sentenced in First Bitcoin Securities-Fraud Case, WALL ST. J. (July
21, 2016, 6:45 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/trendon-shavers-sentenced-in-first-
bitcoin-securities-fraud-case-1469141141.
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Shavers did not concern an ICO, but it answers the important question
of whether an “investment of money” under Howey needs to take the form
of legal tender.  Future courts analyzing Shavers should similarly conclude
that it is immaterial whether investors use cash or cryptocurrency to buy
into ICOs.  In either scenario, investors still “give up something of value.”92
2. SEC v. SG Ltd.: Investors in a Virtual Entity Create a “Common
Enterprise”
Notably, the Shavers court did not specify why the Bitcoin-denomi-
nated Ponzi scheme was a “common enterprise” within the meaning of the
second prong of the Howey test because the issue was uncontested.93
Other federal courts that considered this question have, however, held that
investments in virtual enterprises satisfy the commonality requirement.
This issue was squarely addressed in SEC v. SG Ltd.94  In that 2001
case, the SEC sued a virtual stock exchange for defrauding investors
through its cyberspace game.95  SG Ltd., a Dominican corporation, had
misled investors by promising unrealistic rates of return and then refused
to allow them to redeem their earnings.96  The company argued, in part,
that the virtual shares were part of a legitimate fantasy investment game
created for the personal entertainment of each player and therefore there
was no “commonality” among the players to implicate the federal securities
laws.97
In holding that the virtual shares in the online game were securities,
the First Circuit Court ruled that a showing of “horizontal commonality”
satisfies the Howey test.  Horizontal commonality is shown by the “pooling
of assets from multiple investors in such a manner that all share in the
“profits and risks” of the enterprise.”98  The court found that horizontal
commonality was established here in two ways: (1) the company ran a
Ponzi scheme whereby it depended on a continuous influx of new money
from new members to remain in operation, and (2) the company operated
a pyramid scheme whereby it promised to pay current members twenty to
thirty percent referral fees, which were to be paid out of the money contrib-
uted by the new referrals.99
The SG court’s decision has important implications in the context of
ICOs.  Issuers who are involved in Ponzi or pyramid schemes will automati-
cally be deemed to have satisfied the commonality prong of the Howey test.
Additionally, nearly every ICO to date satisfies the horizontal commonality
requirement because the very essence of an ICO is the “pooling of assets”
and the sharing in the “profits and risks” of the fundraised project.100
92. Shavers, 2014 WL 12622292, at *6 (emphasis added).
93. See id. at *5.
94. 265 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2001).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 44– 45.
97. See id. at 44, 52– 53.
98. Id. at 50.
99. Id. at 51– 52.
100. See Acheson, supra note 30.
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3. In re Munchee Inc.: ICOs Provide a “Reasonable Expectation of
Profits”
In December 2017, the SEC made another significant stride in bring-
ing a cryptocurrency offering under Howey in In re Munchee Inc.101  In its
second administrative enforcement proceeding against an ICO issuer, the
SEC issued an unopposed cease-and-desist order that shut down Munchee,
a California business involved in a token sale.102  Munchee created an
iPhone application (“app”) for people to review restaurant meals and to
purchase food.103  Munchee was seeking to raise $15 million through the
token sale to improve its app and to recruit users to buy advertisements,
write reviews, sell food, and conduct other transactions using its “MUN
token.”104
Munchee told investors that because the MUN tokens would be used
primarily for consumption purposes in the iPhone app, they were “utility
tokens” and not “securities.”105  The SEC disagreed, stating that whether
the token offering is a security does not turn on whether it is labeled as a
“utility token” but on the “economic realities” of the underlying transac-
tions.  The SEC recognized that the MUN tokens were intended to be used
primarily for consumption, including to purchase food and other services
in the iPhone app.106  It found, however, that “[e]ven if [the] MUN tokens
had a practical use at the time of the offering, it would not preclude the
token from being a security.”107  The SEC focused on how Munchee led
investors to reasonably expect profits from (1) the appreciation of the value
of the MUN tokens resulting from Munchee’s efforts in developing its app
and its ability to create a restaurant services “ecosystem” and (2) the sale of
the MUN tokens on the secondary trading market.108  Accordingly, the
SEC concluded that the MUN tokens were securities under Howey and that
Munchee violated section 5 of the Securities Act for failing to register its
offering.109
The SEC’s order in Munchee has critical implications for the applica-
tion of the third prong of the Howey test.  Chiefly, it demonstrates the lim-
ited effectiveness of the “utility” versus “security” distinction in
determining whether the offering gives rise to a “reasonable expectation of
profits.”110  The SEC’s ruling strikes at the heart of the Supreme Court’s
longstanding principle that an investor cannot be said to “reasonably
101. In re Munchee Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10445 at 1 (Dec. 11, 2017) (unop-
posed cease-and-desist order).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 3– 4.
106. Id. at 8.
107. Id. at 9.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 10.
110. See Daniel N. Budofsky & Robert B. Robbins, The Sec’s Shutdown of the Munchee
ICO, PILLSBURY (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.pillsburylaw.com/en/news-and-insights/the-
secs-shutdown-of-the-munchee-ico.html [https://perma.cc/6CCT-WUUB], (describing
how the Munchee order effectively eliminated the longstanding concept of the “utility
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expect profits” when “he purchases a commodity for personal consump-
tion or . . . for personal use.”111  Accordingly, an ICO issuer can no longer
escape the securities laws by characterizing its offering as a “utility” token
or coin.112  Rather, so long as the participants in the ICO have a liquid
secondary market in which to trade the cryptocurrency and an expectation
that the value of cryptocurrency will appreciate as a result of the efforts of
the issuer, the participants will be deemed to have an “expectation of prof-
its,” even if the underlying cryptocurrency has substantial existing utility
at the time of the offering.113  Moving forward, the federal courts should
apply the SEC’s rationale when considering whether investors are led to
expect profits under the Howey test because it comports with Supreme
Court precedent.114
4. The DAO Investigation: ICOs Promise Returns That are “Derived from
the Managerial Efforts of Others”
Finally, the federal courts should also follow the SEC’s detailed gui-
dance in its July 25, 2017 report of investigation (the “Report”) when con-
sidering the fourth prong of the Howey test  because there is no federal
directive on point.  In that Report, the SEC concluded that the German
corporation Slock.it UG and its co-founders had violated section 5 of the
Securities Act through the offer and sale of tokens through a Decentralized
Autonomous Organization (“DAO”).115  The DAO sold unique “DAO
tokens” to fund projects.116  The holders of the DAO tokens shared in the
anticipated earnings from these projects as a return on their investment in
the DAO tokens.117  In addition, the DAO token holders could earn profits
by re-selling their tokens through web-based platforms that supported sec-
ondary trading in the DAO tokens.118
Although the SEC declined to impose charges, the Report is insightful
for future court application because it establishes two key factors for deter-
mining whether an ICO satisfies the fourth prong of the Howey test.  Specif-
ically, ICO participants will be deemed to rely on the managerial efforts of
others to generate profits in an ICO when either (a) the efforts of the foun-
ders or third parties are “essential” to the success of the venture; or (b) the
investors have “no meaningful control” over the venture’s operations.  Both
factors were established here.
token,” which many ICO issuers have relied on to avoid compliance with the Securities
Act).
111. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 858 (1975).
112. See Budofsky & Robbins, supra note 110.
113. See Munchee, Securities Act Release No. 10445 at 9.
114. See, e.g., SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 390 (2004) (broadly defining expecta-
tion of “profits” to include “dividends, other periodic payments, or the increased value of
the investment”).
115. Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934: The DAO, Exchange Act Release No. 81207 at 1– 2 (July 25, 2017).
116. Id. at 1.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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The SEC determined that the managerial and entrepreneurial efforts
of the project’s co-founders and curators were “the ‘undeniably significant’
ones . . . essential to the overall success and profitability of any investment
into the DAO.”119  Specifically, the DAO’s curators actively managed the
investors’ funds, monitored and resolved security breaches by hackers, and
vetted and exerted significant control over the selection of business propos-
als on behalf of the investors.120  Moreover, through their marketing mater-
ials, the co-founders of the DAO led investors to believe that the founders
and curators hired to run the DAO’s projects were “experts” with consider-
able experience in blockchain investing.121  On these facts, among others,
the SEC concluded that the investors “had little choice but to rely on their
expertise” to make the DAO a success.122
The SEC also emphasized that the voting rights that the DAO token
holders were afforded were far too limited to give them “meaningful control
over the enterprise.”123  They were largely “perfunctory.”124  Investors
could vote only on business projects pre-approved by the curators, did not
receive sufficient information to make informed voting decisions, and their
votes were meaningless because the curators could effectively override
their votes by manipulating the quorum requirements.125  Finally, the SEC
emphasized that the widely-dispersed and numerous DAO token holders
could not effectively communicate with one another, so they could not be
deemed to be in a position to effectuate meaningful control.126
The DAO investigation has several implications for future ICO issuers.
Most significantly, it will be practically impossible for issuers to rely on the
active participation of investors as a way to avoid coming under the fourth
prong of the Howey test.127
III. The SEC Has Considerable Extraterritorial Authority to Regulate
ICOs
In the past year, almost all of the enforcement actions the SEC has
brought have been charged under the securities registration requirements
of the Securities Act128 and the antifraud provisions of the Exchange
Act.129  The jurisdictional reach of that regulatory authority, however, has
been brought into question by the international nature of many cryptocur-
rency-based schemes.  This Note examines the scope of the SEC’s extrater-
ritorial authority to adjudicate cross-border ICO transactions.
119. Id. at 15.
120. Id. at 12– 13.
121. Id. at 12.
122. Id. at 13.
123. Id. at 14.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See id. at 12– 15.
128. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 5(a), 5(c), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e(a), 77e(c) (2012).
129. Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2010); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(2017).
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A. The SEC’s Power to Enforce the Securities Registration Requirements
of Section 5 of the Securities Act Has Considerable Force
Outside the U.S.
Under the federal securities laws, the extraterritorial offering of
cryptocurrencies poses serious challenges to defining the scope of section
5 of the Securities Act.130  Section 5 requires an issuer to register its securi-
ties offering or qualify for an exemption from registration.131  The most
common exemptions from the registration requirements are listed under
Regulation D of the Securities Act and include private offerings to a limited
number of persons or institutions;132 offerings of less than five million
dollars;133 and offerings to accredited investors.134  Other Securities Act
registration exemptions include intrastate offerings135 and crowdfunding
transactions, which the SEC recently added in 2015 when it adopted Regu-
lation Crowdfunding in response to Title III of the Jumpstart Our Business
Startups Act of 2012.136
If an issuer fails to register its security offer or to satisfy any such
registration exemption, section 5 prohibits the issuer from using interstate
commerce to offer or sell its unregistered securities.137  “Interstate com-
merce” is broadly defined by section 2(7) of the Securities Act to include
“trade or commerce in securities or any transportation or communication
relating thereto . . . between any foreign country and any State, Territory, or
the District of Columbia.”138  The jurisdictional reach of the definition of
interstate commerce is considerably extensive.  A literal reading of the defi-
nition includes under section 5 any offering by a U.S. issuer, even an offer-
ing made entirely outside the U.S. and only to foreign investors, if in the
process of selling the security abroad the issuer used the U.S. mails or
made telephone calls into the U.S.139  By the same reasoning, a foreign
securities offering that was later resold among investors in the U.S. secon-
dary markets would also trigger section 5’s registration requirements.140
The overreaching scope of section 5 and its inevitable conflict with the
regulations of other countries prompted the SEC to take a series of steps to
limit its application, including the adoption of Regulation S.141  Regulation
S applies a territorial approach to the enforcement of section 5 of the Secur-
ities Act by providing an exemption from the registration requirements for
130. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a– 77aa (2012).
131. Id. § 77e.
132. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b) (2017).
133. Id. § 230.504.
134. Id. § 230.506(c).
135. § 3(a)(11), 15 U.S.C. § 77c (2012).
136. § 4(a)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2012).
137. Id. § 77e.
138. Id. § 77b(a)(7).
139. JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS, 329 (3d ed.
2001).
140. Id.
141. Regulation S— Rules Governing Offers and Sales made Outside the United States
Without Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901– 904
(1990) [hereinafter Reg. S], amended by 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901– 905 (1998).
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offerings made “outside” the U.S. by both U.S. and foreign issuers.142
Because Congress intended for the Securities Act to protect domestic inves-
tors who purchase in the U.S. capital markets, Regulation S also provides
safe harbor exemptions for the extraterritorial issuance and resale of unre-
gistered securities.143  Regulation S exemplifies the SEC’s territorial
approach to securities regulation by recognizing the preeminence of the
laws of the country in which the market and transaction are situated rather
than the nationality of the purchasers or issuers.144
Notwithstanding the territorial focus of Regulation S, the regulation
still provides ample leeway for the SEC to regulate extraterritorial offers
and sales of unregistered securities.  Within the context of an ICO, for
example, the SEC can prosecute a U.S. or foreign issuer who offers or sells
its cryptocurrencies to persons in the U.S. or to an “identifiable group of
U.S. persons abroad” without first registering with the SEC or qualifying
for a registration exemption under Regulations D or S or another provi-
sion.145  In theory, a single sale to an individual U.S. person is sufficient to
trigger the SEC’s policing authority, should the aggregate foreign sale not
meet an available exception.146  Additionally, a sale is not needed to
impose liability; the mere advertisement of an ICO in a publication “with a
general circulation in the United States” is sufficient to subject the foreign
ICO issuer to the federal registration requirements.147
B. The SEC Has Broad Congressional Authority to Police Fraudulent
Cross-Border Securities Transactions Under Section 17(a) of the
Securities Act and Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the
Exchange Act
All security transactions that meet the definition of, even exempt trans-
actions, are subject to the antifraud provisions of the federal securities
laws.148  Section 17(a) is a key antifraud provision in the Securities Act.149
It holds issuers liable for fraudulent sales of securities.150  Specifically, sec-
tion 17(a) makes it unlawful to “employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud” or “obtain money or property” by using material misstatements
or omissions or to “engage in any transaction, practice, or course of busi-
ness which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the pur-
chaser.”151  This provision is closely followed by the other key antifraud
142. An offering or sale of securities occurs “outside the U.S.” when: “(1) The offer or
sale is made in an offshore transaction; [and] (2) No directed selling efforts are made in
the United States by the issuer, a distributor, any of their respective affiliates, or any
person acting on behalf of any of the foregoing.”  17 C.F.R. § 230.903 (2017).
143. Id.
144. Regulation S, Securities Act Release No. 6863, 46 SEC Docket 52 (Apr. 24,
1990).
145. 17 C.F.R. § 230.902(h)(2) (2012).
146. Id. § 230.902(c)(1).
147. Id. § 230.902(c).
148. Id. § 230.903.
149. Securities Act of 1933, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q (2010).
150. Id.
151. Id.
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prohibitions, section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act.152
Under these antifraud provisions, it is clear that ICO issuers who qual-
ify for an exemption from the registration requirements of section 5 may
nonetheless still be liable for materially false and misleading statements
made in connection with their fundraising efforts.  The question that has
been heatedly debated in section 10(b) and 17(a) litigation, however, is
whether these antifraud provisions apply to extraterritorial cryptocurrency
offerings and whether they interfere with foreign securities regulation.  To
avoid that consequence, until 2010 the federal courts adopted a transac-
tional approach to foreign securities regulation.
1. Morrison v. Australian National Bank: The U.S. Securities Laws Apply
Only to “Domestic Transactions”
The leading case embracing the transactional approach to U.S. securi-
ties regulation is Morrison v. National Australian Bank Ltd.153  In Morrison,
the Supreme Court upheld the longstanding “transactional test,” which
mandates that section 10(b) of the Exchange Act applies only to “transac-
tions in securities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions
in other securities.”154  In reaching this decision, the Supreme Court
rejected the “conduct and effects” test that the lower courts had used to
determine whether a foreign transaction was covered by section 10(b) of
the Exchange Act and section 17(a) of the Securities Act.155  That test
extended the antifraud provisions of the U.S. securities laws to an extrater-
ritorial transaction if significant wrongful conduct related to the transac-
tion occurred in the U.S. or if “the wrongful conduct had a substantial
effect in the United States or upon United States citizens.”156 Morrison
clarified that the question of the extraterritorial reach of section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 was not a jurisdictional issue, but rather a merits question of
whether the Exchange Act governs non-domestic transactions.157  Because
there was no express congressional intent to rebut the longstanding pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality, the Supreme Court held that it did
not.158  Thus, it further held that the anti-fraud provisions of the Exchange
Act apply “only to transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges
and domestic transactions in other securities.”159
2. SEC v. Traffic Monsoon, LLC: The Dodd Frank Act Restores the
“Conduct and Effects” Test with Respect to Extraterritorial Transactions
Less than a month after Morrison was decided, Congress enacted the
Dodd-Frank Act.  Section 929P(b) of Dodd-Frank codified the “conduct
152. Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2010); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(2017).
153. 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
154. Id. at 268.
155. Id. at 255, 267.
156. Id. at 257.
157. Id. at 247.
158. Id. at 263– 64.
159. Id. at 249.
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and effects” test for SEC court actions arising under sections 10b of the
Exchange Act and 17(a) of the Securities Act.160  This sparked considera-
ble debate among the SEC and securities litigators as to whether section
929P(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act reinstated the conduct and effects test that
had just been repudiated in Morrison, or whether section 929P(b) left the
Morrison transactional test in place.161
The U.S. District Court for the District of Utah decided those ques-
tions in SEC v. Traffic Monsoon, LLC.162  The judge ruled that the Dodd-
Frank Act did not explicitly overturn the core holding of Morrison— that
the Exchange Act applies only to securities listed on domestic exchanges or
certain domestic transactions.163  It did, however, restore the conduct and
effects test with respect to the jurisdiction of the courts to adjudicate SEC
enforcement actions.164  Under the slightly-modified conduct and effects
test promulgated by the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC can implicate the juris-
diction of the federal courts to prosecute foreign purchases and sales of
securities, even if the securities transactions are made entirely outside the
U.S. and involve only foreign investors, if significant steps in furtherance of
the fraudulent conduct occurred in the U.S., or if the fraudulent conduct
occurred outside the U.S. but had a foreseeable substantial effect in the
U.S.165  Under that test, the court held that the promoter’s mere creation
and promotion of website advertising packages online while residing in the
U.S. were “significant steps” to subject the promoter to liability under the
federal securities laws, notwithstanding that ninety percent of the sales
were made to foreign investors residing outside of the U.S.166  Given the
implication of this decision on international securities transactions, the
judge in Traffic Monsoon immediately certified the case for appeal.167  That
appeal is still pending as of May 2018.
The Traffic Monsoon ruling is far more confusing than helpful in
delineating the extraterritorial scope of the U.S. securities laws.  Chiefly,
Traffic Monsoon implies that the extraterritorial reach of the Exchange Act
depends on the forum in which the statute is enforced.  The decision sug-
gests that the SEC has no congressional authority to regulate a foreign ICO
in an administrative enforcement proceeding but it does if it proceeds in
court.  Whether Congress intended for this effect will be argued on appeal.
Federal courts outside the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, how-
ever, will not be bound by the Traffic Monsoon appeal.  Thus, until the
Supreme Court decides the issue, the consequence under the Dodd-Frank
Act will remain the same: the Exchange Act applies extraterritorially in
court actions brought by the SEC if the conduct and effects test can be
satisfied.
160. SEC v. Traffic Monsoon, LLC, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1275, 1288– 89 (D. Utah 2017).
161. Id. at 1289.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1287, 1294.
167. Id. at 1303– 04.
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What is less clear, however, is how Traffic Monsoon implicates other
directives of SEC enforcement.  Section 929P(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act
applies only to “wrongful” conduct, which requires a showing of an intent
to deceive or negligence under section 10(b) of the Exchange Act168 and
section 17(a) of the Securities Act,169 respectively.  Thus, this raises the
question of whether the SEC can utilize the conduct and effects test to
bring suit against extraterritorial ICOs in cases in which only a violation of
section 5’s registration requirements, which have a strict liability standard,
is charged.170
Perhaps the most fatal flaw of the Traffic Monsoon decision is the
inconsistency and uncertainty in the application of the conduct and effects
test.  How does one determine what domestic acts constitute “significant
steps” to avoid triggering the application of the securities laws for injury to
foreigners abroad?  In Morrison, the Supreme Court recognized that
“merely preparatory activities” in the U.S. would not suffice.171  But this is
exactly the opposite conclusion reached by the district court in Traffic Mon-
soon, which held that the promoter’s mere creation and promotion of the
offering from a U.S.-based computer was sufficient to bring the entire for-
eign transaction (comprising ninety percent of the total sales) under the
ambit of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.172
In the context of an ICO, the Traffic Monsoon decision also makes it
unclear when the online exchange of cryptocurrencies in the nascent stage
of an ICO converts from a foreign transaction to a domestic one.  This issue
arises because the blockchain on which a cryptocurrency is based con-
stantly expands as new “blocks” that record the most recent cryptocur-
rency transactions are added to the ledger.173  The network supporting the
blockchain operates across geographic borders and can be accessed by any
individual who has permission.174  Is the blockchain merely the record-
keeping of an ICO but not the transaction itself, or is the blockchain an
inseparable component of an ICO?175
3. SEC v. PlexCorps: There is Inherent Difficulty in Applying SEC v.
Traffic Monsoon to a Cross-Border ICO
The crux of these cross-jurisdictional challenges are exemplified by
SEC v. PlexCorps.176  In that enforcement action, the SEC brought suit
against a Canadian ICO in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
168. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2017).
169. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2010).
170. Jared L. Kopel, SEC Directs Regulatory Fire at Initial Coin Offerings, THE
RECORDER (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.law.com/therecorder/sites/legaltechnews/
2018/01/30/sec-directs-regulatory-fire-at-initial-coin-offerings/ [https://perma.cc/
62HY-LM45].
171. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 258 (2010).
172. See Traffic Monsoon, 245 F. Supp. 3d at 1294.
173. Kopel, supra note 170.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. No. 1:17-cv-07007-CBA-RML, 2017 WL 5988934 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2017).
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of New York.177  The SEC’s complaint charges two Quebec residents and
their unincorporated Canadian company PlexCorps for allegedly market-
ing and selling “PlexCoin,” a cryptocurrency, to investors in the U.S. and
other countries, resulting in a reported $15 million in fraudulently
obtained proceeds.178
The SEC successfully obtained an asset freeze order and preliminary
injunction against the defendants to preserve the investors’ funds in
Canada.179  This prompted a heated debate between the parties over
whether the district court could exercise personal jurisdiction over the
Canadian defendants to adjudicate the SEC’s registration and fraud claims.
The jurisdictional battle in this case highlights the potential challenges
that will arise in offshore ICO enforcement actions after Traffic Monsoon.
The PlexCorps defendants, like many foreign ICO promoters, took deliber-
ate precautions to exclude U.S. persons from participating in the PlexCoin
offering.  It required all investors to confirm that they were not a U.S. citi-
zen and were not purchasing the PlexCoins on behalf of a U.S. citizen.180
As is common with most ICOs, however, the PlexCoin advertisements were
in English and were distributed on the internet and on social media,
including a Facebook page, that U.S. investors could access.181  Thus,
PlexCorps raises the important question of whether prominent disclaimers
and self-certification procedures in an offshore ICO are sufficient precau-
tions to preclude a determination that wrongful conduct related to the ICO
would have a “foreseeable substantial effect” in the U.S.
While this question has yet to be decided in connection with an ICO
specifically, the answer is likely no.  An offshore offer and solicitation of
securities via the internet is not deemed to take place “in” the U.S. when
the web site includes a prominent disclaimer that the offer is not directed
to the U.S. and the promoter implements “reasonable” procedures to guard
against sales to U.S. persons.182  These reasonable procedures include, at a
minimum, collecting the purchaser’s mailing address or telephone num-
bers prior to the sale.183  The foreign issuer must also implement addi-
tional reasonable precautions when, like in PlexCorps, the offering
materials are posted on third-party websites that have a significant number
of U.S. subscribers, such as Facebook.184  These more stringent precau-
tions include limiting access to offering materials to persons who can
177. Complaint ¶ 1, PlexCorps, No. 1:17-cv-07007-CBA-RML (Dec. 1, 2017), ECF No.
1.
178. Id.
179. Order Granting Prelim. Inj., Asset Freeze, and Other Interim Relief at 7,
PlexCorps, No. 1:17-cv-07007-CBA-RML (Dec. 14, 2017), ECF No. 25.
180. Letter Regarding Motion for Pre Mot. Conference at 2, PlexCorps, No. 1:17-cv-
07007-CBA-RML (Dec. 21, 2017), ECF No. 27.
181. Compl. ¶¶ 7, 42– 43, PlexCorps, No. 1:17-cv-07007-CBA-RML.
182. Statement of the Commission Regarding Use of Internet Web Sites to Offer
Securities, Solicit Securities Transactions or Advertise Investment Services Offshore,
Securities Act Release No. 33-7516 (Mar. 23, 1998), available at https://www.sec.gov/
rules/interp/33-7516.htm [https://perma.cc/Z9TN-YDA8].
183. Id.
184. Id.
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prove that they are not U.S. persons.185  These precautions are not exhaus-
tive.186  If the foreign offeror has any indication that it has sold to U.S.
persons, including, but not limited to, receiving notice that investors made
payments using U.S. bank accounts as in PlexCorps, it must take other
measures, as necessary, to prevent future sales to U.S. persons.187
Although this criteria applies to determine whether an offshore internet
offering targets U.S. investors and, therefore, implicates section 5’s registra-
tion requirements, a similar framework has been applied to determine the
“foreseeable” effect of extraterritorial fraudulent misconduct in the U.S.188
Thus, the courts will likely apply this framework to ICOs to try to bring
structure to a rather ambiguous “effects” test.
PlexCorps also raises the question of whether the use of U.S.-based
online payment processors, such as PayPal and Square, to process offshore
ICOs, alone or considered together with other pre-planning actions, is suffi-
cient U.S. “conduct” to maintain personal jurisdiction under section
929P(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act.  In Traffic Monsoon, minor U.S. pre-sale
marketing efforts alone were sufficient.189  But it is unclear whether the
“conduct” test is met in PlexCorps, where the only U.S. pre-sale activities
were agreements with third party payment processers.190
4. The SEC’s International Enforcement Assistance Program Under the
Exchange Act
PlexCorps further underscores another important challenge for the
SEC in future enforcement proceedings targeting fraudulent ICOs that take
place abroad: its ability (or lack thereof) to detect and prosecute foreign
violators and to seize the proceeds of fraudulent offerings.  Technological
advances have facilitated the sale of cryptocurrencies across borders and
increased investment opportunities for foreign investors.  These same
advances, however, also make it inherently difficult for the SEC to identify
perpetrators and to stop their illegal activities.
This Note argues that the SEC already has the resources at its disposal
to effectively regulate foreign securities by virtue of its authority under the
international enforcement and assistance provisions of the Exchange Act.
Specifically, section 21(a)(2) of the Exchange Act authorizes the SEC to
assist foreign securities authorities in the investigation of securities frauds
that violate any laws or rules relating to securities matters that the foreign
securities authorities administer or enforce.191  The SEC can provide assis-
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See, e.g., SEC v. Straub, 921 F. Supp. 2d 244, 254– 58 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (exercising
jurisdiction over foreign defendants whose sole jurisdiction-conferring act was to make
statements directed in part at U.S. investors).
189. See 245 F. Supp. 3d 1275, 1288– 89.
190. See Compl. ¶¶ 93, 107, No. 1:17-cv-07007-CBA-RML.
191. International Enforcement Assistance, SEC (Oct. 16, 2014), www.sec.gov/about/
offices/oia/oia_crossborder.shtml [https://perma.cc/36AR-H9QH] [hereinafter Interna-
tional Enforcement].
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tance to a foreign governmental body regardless of whether the conduct in
question is a violation of U.S. law.192  In providing assistance, the SEC can
exercise a variety of compulsory tools, including compelling the produc-
tion of documents and testimony from any person and entity, even if that
person or entity cannot be regulated by the SEC.193
Importantly, the SEC benefits significantly from these cooperative,
reciprocal exchanges.194  The SEC primarily assists foreign securities
authorities who “agree[ ] to provide reciprocal assistance in securities mat-
ters” to the SEC.195  The SEC is most inclined to assist foreign securities
authorities who will in turn help the SEC investigate perpetrators who
would otherwise fall outside of the SEC’s jurisdiction, either because the
individual or entity resides outside of the U.S. or the conduct in question
occurred in another country.196  In essence, the geographic boundaries of
the U.S. are not a limit to its enforcement abilities.197  The SEC can, and
often does, rely on its established goodwill and vast global alliance with
foreign agencies to combat cross-border securities fraud.198
5. The SEC’s International Information-Sharing Arrangements Will Enable
it to Regulate Cross-Border ICOs
The SEC’s success in detecting, investigating, and prosecuting foreign
securities violations is primarily attributable to the SEC’s information-
sharing arrangements with foreign securities regulators.199  The SEC
largely utilizes multilateral and bilateral information-sharing arrangements
with foreign authorities to carry out its international enforcement
duties.200  These arrangements operate on the basis of memoranda of
understanding (“MOU”) between the SEC and the foreign securities
authorities.201  The MOUs set forth the scope and terms of information-
sharing among the MOU participants.202  Importantly, they memorialize
the intent of the parties to fully cooperate in international securities law
enforcement.203
The prevailing information-sharing agreement governing cross-border
securities regulation is the Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding
Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of Informa-
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See id.
195. Id.
196. See id.
197. See International Enforcement, supra note 191.
198. See id. (listing various recent securities enforcement cases that were resolved
with cooperation with foreign government agencies and involve foreign incorporated
companies).
199. See id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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tion (“MMOU”).204  The MMOU was created in 2002 by the International
Organization of Securities Commissions to provide a framework for com-
bating cross-border fraud and to expand cooperation and information-
sharing among foreign securities regulators.205  Today, it is the largest
international multilateral information-sharing arrangement among securi-
ties regulatory bodies.206  The SEC was among the first agencies to sign the
MMOU in 2002.207  As of 2018, there are 117 signatories to the MMOU,
representing securities and derivatives regulators from over 100
countries.208
Pursuant to the MMOU, the securities regulators agree to provide
information and assistance to other member regulators upon request.209
The type of assistance to be made to members is extensive.210  Specifically,
the regulators to the MMOU agree to share information and documents
held in their possession.211  If the information that is requested is not in
the regulators’ files, the regulator must make efforts to obtain the informa-
tion and documents concerning the transactions.212  These documents
often include bank and brokerage account information, including detailed
confidential information regarding the beneficial owners of the
accounts.213  Finally, the regulators agree to take or compel a person’s
statement or, when possible, testimony under oath, concerning the alleged
violation.214  The agency receiving the information is permitted to use it in
civil or administrative enforcement proceedings.215
The types of offenses for which information requests can be made are
also extensive.216  The list of permissible requests includes information
regarding “misrepresentation of material information and other fraudulent
or manipulative practices relating to securities and derivatives” and “the
registration, issuance, offer, or sale of securities and derivatives.”217
The MMOU has had a transformational effect on the SEC’s interna-
tional policing efforts.  It has greatly improved the ease and speed with
which the SEC is able to obtain information concerning potential viola-
tions in other jurisdictions around the world.218  As a result, the SEC can
quickly and effectively pursue its international enforcement investiga-
204. Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation Cooperation
and the Exchange of Information (MMoU), ORGANIZATION OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONS
(2018), https://www.iosco.org/about/?subsection=MMou [https://perma.cc/P5BG-
5UGG] [hereinafter Multilateral Memorandum].
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See Multilateral Memorandum, supra note 204.
216. See id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
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tions.219  Additionally, the MMOU has strengthened international coopera-
tion in securities enforcement and incentivized countries with strict laws
prohibiting information-sharing to pass legislation that will permit them to
do so.220
This Note argues that the success of the MMOU will have significant
implications in the context of ICO regulation.  It will become exceedingly
difficult for perpetrators to avoid detection and prosecution for failing to
register their ICOs or for defrauding investors by moving their scams and
fraudulent activities overseas.  The SEC will utilize its extensive global net-
work of law enforcement and governmental agencies to investigate and
prosecute ICO issuers who violate the registration or antifraud provisions
of the U.S. securities laws.
6. The SEC’s Strong Relationships with Foreign Criminal Authorities Will
Facilitate Its International Securities Enforcement Efforts
In addition to the MMOU and similar reciprocal information-sharing
arrangements, the SEC has other methods by which it can obtain enforce-
ment-related information concerning ICOs.221  One way it can do so is by
requesting information from foreign criminal agencies under various
mutual legal assistance treaties administered by the United States Depart-
ment of Justice.222  Although less common, the SEC can also petition a U.S.
court to send an information request to a judicial authority in another
country.223  Under the concept of reciprocity, most foreign judicial author-
ities are willing to comply.224  For example, in 2011, the SEC issued 772
requests to criminal enforcement agencies in other countries for assistance
with investigations.225  On the other hand, the SEC corresponded with 492
requests for information from foreign authorities.226
Ultimately, strong international cooperation among various interna-
tional securities and criminal enforcement agencies will prove vital to the
SEC’s ability to promptly, effectively, and appropriately regulate the U.S.
offer and sale of cryptocurrencies in cross-border ICOs.
Conclusion
To date, the handful of federal SEC enforcement lawsuits and adminis-
trative proceedings that have considered whether cryptocurrency transac-
tions similar to ICOs are subject to the U.S. securities laws have concluded
that they were investment contracts under the Howey test.227  In reaching
these determinations, the courts and regulators have applied the same facts
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. See id.
225. See Multilateral Memorandum, supra note 204.
226. Id.
227. See supra pp.12– 19.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\51-1\CIN108.txt unknown Seq: 27  9-AUG-18 16:39
2018 Foreign Initial Coin Offering Issuers Beware 271
and circumstances analysis from Howey.228  They disregard form for sub-
stance and emphasize the economic realities of the transactions.229  The
focus is thus on the expectations of the investors and the future rights they
are promised in connection with the cryptocurrency offering.230  Moving
forward, future judges will likely draw upon these rulings and similarly
conclude that the federal securities laws apply to most forms of ICOs.
The U.S. approach to the regulation of ICOs in cross-border transac-
tions, however, requires reevaluation.  The 2017 Traffic Monsoon decision,
which restores the conduct and effects test under the Dodd-Frank Act with
respect to extraterritorial securities offerings, has far-reaching implica-
tions.231  That test empowers the SEC to bring fraud claims in court
against virtually any foreign ICO, even those that occur entirely outside the
U.S. and involve only foreign investors, so long as wrongful conduct
occurred in or had a foreseeable substantial effect in the country.232  As
exemplified by Traffic Monsoon, however, the conduct and effects test has
the potential to regulate mere pre-sale preparation activity in cases in
which no purchase or sale is actually made in the U.S.233  This is conduct
that is so far removed from any real meaningful connection to the U.S.  If
not overturned on appeal, the conduct and effects test will lead to the same
inconsistent and inequitable applications of the antifraud provisions of the
securities laws to transnational cases that prompted the Supreme Court to
overturn the test in Morrison in the first place.234
Accordingly, in exercising this broad extraterritorial authority under
the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC should take precautions to prevent a tremen-
dous overreach of international laws and towards foreign persons who are
not subject to personal jurisdiction in the U.S.  As Bitcoins and other
cryptocurrencies go mainstream in the global capital markets, the SEC
needs to take a more balanced approach to the regulation of cross-border
transactions to avoid the judicial squandering of resources that are better
served in targeting ICOs that pose the greatest risk of injury to what really
matters: the U.S. markets and the investors that participate in them.
A balanced approach to domestic and foreign regulation of ICOs is
one that promotes both the development of the cryptocurrency market and
provides adequate protection to U.S. investors from the risk of participat-
ing in ICO transactions.  These seemingly conflicting goals are, in fact, pos-
sible.  The SEC already regulates other decentralized technology
transactions like crowdfunding with great success on both fronts.  The SEC
should implement an approach that follows how it currently regulates
crowdfunding.  Certainly, the technology underlying crowdfunding and
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. See id.
231. SEC v. Traffic Monsoon, LLC, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1275 (D. Utah 2017).
232. See id. at 1294.
233. See id. at 1287 (finding that the issuer made “significant steps” in the U.S.
because he created and promoted the securities while physically residing in the U.S.,
although 90% of the securities were sold to foreign investors located outside the U.S.).
234. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 260– 61 (2010).
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ICOs are vastly different, but the SEC has tools at its disposal to overcome
any mechanical differences.  For example, it should use the same technol-
ogy that states use to regulate internet gambling to control the flow of digi-
tal coins and tokens purchased and sold in ICOs.  To do this, the SEC and
other relevant federal agencies can regulate the issuers and investors’ vir-
tual wallets, as is done with internet gambling.  Regulators control the vir-
tual wallets of gamblers by monitoring the credit card companies and
financial institutions that facilitate the purchase of digital currency using a
gambler’s credit or bank savings.  The SEC and other relevant federal agen-
cies could easily adopt a similar approach.
While there are various regulatory approaches to wholly extraterrito-
rial securities offerings that will satisfy Congress’s twin aim of protecting
U.S. investors and the U.S. capital markets from fraud and similar harm
coming both from outside and within the country, the best approach to
ICO regulation is a territorial one that focuses not on the place where the
deception originated or on the nationalities of the offering participants,
but rather on the location of the actual purchase and sale of the securities.
It is those purchase-and-sale transactions and the parties or prospective
parties to those transactions that the Securities Act and Exchange Act seek
to regulate and protect.  This approach is embodied by the domestic trans-
actions test set forth in Morrison and should be applied in connection with
all SEC regulation of ICOs.
